

Virginia Department of Health Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (VHF): Overview for Healthcare Providers*

Organism*	Arenaviridae: Lassa virus, Lujo virus, New World arenaviruses (Chapare, Guanarito, Junin, Machupo, and Sabia)	Bunyaviridae: Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (CCHF) virus, Rift Valley fever (RVF) virus, hantavirus	<i>Filoviridae:</i> Ebola virus (Sudan, Zaire, Reston, Tai Forest, and Bundibugyo), Marburg virus, Ravn virus	<i>Flaviviridae</i> : Yellow fever (YF) virus, dengue virus, Alkhurma hemorrhagic fever (AHF) virus, Kyasanur Forest disease (KFD) virus, Omsk hemorrhagic fever (OHF) virus		
Reporting to Public Health	suspected or confirmed cases of VHF require immediate notification to the local health department (LHD). Suspected or confirmed cases of dengue and hantavirus pulmonary syndrome require reporting to the LHD within 3 days. See https://www.ydb.virginia.gov/health-department-locator/					
Occurrence	Lassa: West Africa Lujo: Zambia and South Africa New World arenaviruses: Americas	CCHF: Africa, Eurasia RVF: Africa, Saudi Arabia, Yemen	Africa	YF: Africa, tropical Americas Dengue: Asia, the Pacific, the Americas, Africa, and Caribbean AHF: Saudi Arabia, Egypt KFD: India; OHF: Siberia		
Natural Reservoir	Rodents	CCHF: ticks, livestock are	Ebola: potentially fruit bats	YF, dengue: mosquito		
Route of Infection	All: Primarily inhalation of aerosols of rodent excreta; ingestion of contaminated food. In addition, Lassa: percutaneous, person-to- person transmission, sexual transmission Lujo: person-to-person transmission	All: Vector-borne, contact with infected animals. In addition, RVF: possible consumption of contaminated raw milk, reported airborne transmission in labs CCHF: person-to-person transmission	Contact with infected persons, body fluids or animals; percutaneous, person-to person, sexual transmission	AHF, KFD, OHF: ticks All: Bite from infected insect. In addition, YF: parenteral or unexplained (possibly aerosol) transmission in labs; vertical transmission from mother to infant KFD: aerosol transmission in lab OHF: contact with infected animal; waterborne and airborne transmission might occur		
Risk Factors (in addition to living in/traveling to endemic areas)	Rodent exposure (inhalation of aerosols, direct contact), close contact with infected patients; manipulating specimens in labs	Close contact with infected patients or animals; manipulating specimens in labs	All: Close contact with infected patients or animals; manipulating specimens in labs. In addition, Marburg: visiting bat caves	All: Insect exposure. In addition, AHF: contact with livestock; KFD: exposure to rural, outdoor settings, handling of cattle; OHF: contact with infected animals (e.g., muskrats), manipulating specimens in labs		

Case-fatality Rate	Lassa: 1% overall, 15–20% among	CCHF: 9–50% in hospitalized	Ebola: ~50% overall, 25–90% in	YF: 30–60% for severe cases		
	hospitalized cases	cases, 10–40% in outbreaks	outbreaks	AHF: 1–20% in hospitalized cases		
	Lujo: 80% in 1 outbreak	RVF: <1% overall, ~50% in	Marburg: 23–90%	KFD: 3–5%; OHF: <1–3%		
		hemorrhagic cases				
Incubation Period	Lassa: 6–21 days	CCHF, RVF: 2–10 days	Ebola, Marburg: 2–21 days	YF: 3–6 days		
	New World arenaviruses: 5–21			Dengue: 4–7 days		
	days			AHF: 2–4 days		
				KFD and OHF: 3–8 days		
Clinical Description	In general, initial signs and symptoms include fever, headache, muscle pain, erythematous maculopapular rash on the trunk, vomiting, diarrhea,					
	abdominal pain, or bleeding					
Differential	Malaria, influenza, viral hepatitis, bacterial sepsis, toxic shock syndrome, meningococcemia, salmonellosis, shigellosis, rickettsial disease,					
Diagnosis	leptospirosis, borreliosis, psittacosis, dengue, trypanosomiasis, septicemic plague, rubella, measles, and hemorrhagic smallpox					
Radiography	Pulmonary edema or hemorrhage, acute respiratory distress, dilated bowels with signs of ileus or dynamic intestinal obstruction					
Specimen	Tests: serology, immunohistochemistry, PCR, antigen-detection enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay, and virus isolation. Testing requires high					
Collection and	containment (Biosafety Level 3 or 4). Testing performed at CDC, except for preliminary testing for Ebola virus by PCR (Warrior Panel Multiplex RT-					
Laboratory	PCR or Ebola Zaire real time PCR) that can be performed at the Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services (DCLS); preliminary positive results					
Testing	require confirmatory testing at CDC. If VHF is suspected, notify LHD immediately to discuss the case and laboratory testing. Specimens may be sent					
	to DCLS after VDH has approved testing. For questions about specimen collection, DCLS Emergency Officer can be reached 24/7 at 804-335-4617.					
Treatment	Ribavirin, supportive care	Ribavirin, supportive care	Supportive care	Supportive care		
	New World viruses: monoclonal		Ebola: Inmazeb™ and Ebanga™,			
	antibody therapy has shown		FDA-approved monoclonal			
	efficacy in experimental models		antibodies for Zaire ebolavirus			
Postexposure	Lassa: oral ribavirin may be used	CCHF: ribavirin has shown some	Not available	Not available		
Prophylaxis [†]	for high-risk exposure	benefit				
Vaccine	Argentine hemorrhagic fever	RVF: investigational vaccine	Ebola: ERVEBO [®] FDA-approved	YF: FDA-approved vaccine		
	(Junin virus): investigational	available	for Zaire ebolavirus. [‡] Other	available		
	vaccine available		investigational vaccines available	KFD: vaccine used in India		
Infection Control [§]	In general, immediately isolate the patient and implement Standard, Contact and Droplet Precautions for the duration of illness. Hemorrhagic fever					
	specific barrier precautions (Standard, Contract, and Airborne Precautions) are recommended if bioterrorism is suspected or if the epidemiology of					
	virus transmission is unpredictable or unknown. For Ebola, see CDC's guidance for clinicians: https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/clinicians/index.html					

*Other hemorrhagic fever viruses exist within these categories. However, the viruses that pose the most serious risk as biological weapons are: arenaviruses (Lassa virus, New World arenaviruses), bunyaviruses (Rift Valley fever virus), filoviruses (Ebola virus, Marburg virus), and flaviviruses (yellow fever virus, Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus, Kyasanur Forest disease virus); dengue virus, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever viruses and hantaviruses are considered less likely to be used as biological weapons (Borio, et al 2002). The role of other hemorrhagic fever viruses as potential weapons is not known. [†]The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense did not recommend prophylactic antiviral therapy for persons exposed to any hemorrhagic fever viruses (including Lassa virus) in the absence of clinical illness (Borio, et al 2002); instead, the group recommended monitoring the exposed person for 21 days and, if symptoms suggestive of VHF develop or fever (≥101°F) is documented, ribavirin therapy should be initiated unless another diagnosis is confirmed (or the etiologic agent is known to be a filovirus or flavivirus). Borio, et al 2002 available here: https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/194908 ***ERVEBO® is not commercially marketed but is in the Strategic National Stockpile. Available from CDC for preexposure vaccination:** https://www.cdc.gov/uhf/ebola/clinicians/vaccine/index.html ***Gource:** https://www.cdc.gov/uhf/ebola/clinicians/vaccine/index.html ***Gource:** https://www.cdc.gov/uhf/ebola/clinicians/vaccine/index.html ***Gource:** https://www.cdc.gov/uhf/ebola/clinicians/index.html ***Gource:** <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/u