

Virginia Department of Health Viral Hemorrhagic Fever: Guidance for Healthcare Providers

Key Medical and Public Health Interventions after Identification of a Suspected Case

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1. Epidemiology

Viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) refers to a group of illnesses that are caused by viruses from the following three distinct families (*Arenaviridae*, *Filoviridae*, *and Flaviviridae*) and one order (*Bunyavirales*) of viruses:

- Arenaviridae (e.g., Old World viruses: Lassa virus, Lujo virus; New World viruses: Chapare, Guanarito, Junin, Machupo and Sabia viruses)
- Bunyavirales (e.g., Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus, Rift Valley fever virus, Hantavirus)
- Filoviridae (e.g., Ebola virus and Marburg virus)
- Flaviviridae (e.g., yellow fever virus, dengue virus, Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus, Kyasanur forest disease virus)

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also includes certain Paramyxoviridae viruses (e.g., Hendra virus and Nipah virus) in this group.

VHF viruses can cause a severe multisystem syndrome whereby the overall vascular system is damaged and the body's ability to respond is impaired. Other key characteristics of these viruses are the following:

- They are all RNA viruses and are covered or enveloped in a fatty (lipid) coating.
- The viruses are geographically restricted to the areas where their host species live. Most occur in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, or focal areas of South America. The hantavirus that causes hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS) occurs naturally in the United States. Of note, because the response to a suspected or confirmed case of HPS is different than that for other VHFs like Ebola or Marburg virus disease, VDH does not consider HPS a VHF for public health response purposes. The hantaviruses that cause the

- hemorrhagic form called hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (e.g., Hantaan, Dobrava, Saaremaa, Seoul, and Puumala) do not occur naturally in the United States.
- The survival of these viruses is dependent on a natural reservoir (e.g., animal or insect host). The natural reservoir depends on the specific virus involved but can include ruminants (Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus, Rift Valley fever virus), bats (Marburg virus and potentially Ebola virus), or rodents (arenaviruses and hantaviruses).
- Humans are infected when they come into contact with infected hosts. In addition, vectorborne
 transmission can occur with several viruses via mosquitoes (Rift Valley fever virus, dengue virus) or ticks
 (Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus, Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus, Kyasanur Forest disease virus).
 After transmission of the virus from the host, person-to-person transmission can occur with some of
 these viruses through direct contact with symptomatic patients, body fluids, cadavers, or contaminated
 objects (Lassa virus, New World arenaviruses, filoviruses, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus).
- Human cases or outbreaks of viral hemorrhagic fevers occur sporadically among people who live in or travel to endemic areas. The occurrence of outbreaks cannot be easily predicted.
- With a few noteworthy exceptions, there is no cure or established drug treatment for VHFs.

Many viruses that cause hemorrhagic fever (e.g., Ebola virus, Marburg virus, Lassa fever virus) are designated as a Category A bioterrorism agent (i.e., one that is easily disseminated or transmitted with a higher rate of mortality than a Category B agent) and a select agent, which means that possession, use, or transfer of these organisms requires registration with CDC or USDA. If VHF is suspected or confirmed, the local health department should be notified immediately so that a public health investigation can be initiated.

The epidemiology of several viruses causing VHF is described in more detail in the Appendix.

2. Clinical Manifestations

The incubation period depends on the etiologic agent, but it can be as long as 21 days. For this reason, collecting a thorough history of travel and exposures within the 21 days before illness onset is critical.

Although some viruses cause relatively mild illnesses, other viruses cause severe, life-threatening disease. Signs and symptoms vary by disease, but, in general, include fever, headache, muscle pain, erythematous maculopapular rash on the trunk, vomiting, diarrhea, pharyngitis (arenavirus only), abdominal pain, bleeding (not related to injury) and retrosternal chest pain (arenavirus only). Vascular endothelial damage leads to shock and pulmonary edema. Liver injury is common. Signs or symptoms seen with specific viruses include renal failure (hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome associated with hantaviruses), bruises (Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever), hearing loss and shock in newborns (Lassa fever), and spontaneous abortion and birth defects (Lassa fever).

The case-fatality rate varies by the etiologic agent. <u>Appendix</u> includes case-fatality rates of several viruses causing VHF.

3. Laboratory Testing and Diagnosis

Notification When VHF is Suspected

If VHF is suspected, the healthcare provider should immediately report the case to the <u>local health</u> <u>department</u> (LHD) per <u>Virginia's disease reporting regulations</u>. The LHD will discuss options for public health testing. If the Virginia Department of Health (VDH) approves public health testing, specimens may be sent to

the Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services (DCLS). The health department will facilitate notification and shipment to DCLS. Specimens potentially containing a virus that causes VHF should never be shipped to DCLS without prior approval.

Laboratory Biosafety

Laboratory personnel must be alerted if VHF is suspected so that they can take appropriate precautions.

Diagnostic Testing

In general, diagnostic testing for viruses causing VHF requires high containment (e.g., Biosafety Level 3 or 4 practices). Testing is typically performed only at CDC. The one exception to this is that DCLS can perform preliminary PCR (Warrior Panel Multiplex RT-PCR) testing for Sudan, Zaire, Reston, Tai Forest, and Bundibugyo ebolaviruses and Marburg/Ravn viruses, or real time PCR analyses for Zaire ebolavirus, if CDC approves testing; confirmatory testing is conducted at CDC.

Multiple test types can be used to diagnose a VHF. The availability of the test depends on the agent. In general, testing includes enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) for antigen or antibody detection, viral isolation in cell culture for blood or tissues, detection of VHF-specific genetic targets by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) from blood or tissues, and detection of VHF viral antigens in tissues by immunohistochemistry.

Sample Collection

General instructions for VHF testing at DCLS or CDC are shown in the Table below. For Ebola virus, refer to DCLS instructions.

Because of the highly infectious nature of these organisms, consultation with DCLS about specimen collection and handling is strongly recommended. The DCLS Emergency Officer can be reached 24/7 at 804-335-4617.

Case Definitions used by Public Health

The 2022 CDC case definition for VHF is available. Specific viruses described in the case definition include the following: Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus, Ebola virus, Lassa virus, Lujo virus, Marburg virus, and New World arenaviruses (Chapare, Guanarito, Junin, Machupo, and Sabia viruses). Note that a case definition is a set of uniform criteria used to define a disease for public health surveillance. Case definitions enable public health to classify and count cases consistently across reporting jurisdictions and should not be used by healthcare providers to determine how to meet an individual patient's health needs.

For Ebola, the CDC definition of a suspect case (formerly referred to as a Person Under Investigation, or PUI) is available on the <u>Screening Patients website</u>. Both clinical findings and relevant risk factors within the 21 days before illness onset are required to meet the definition of a suspect case and pursue public health testing.

Table. Sample collection instruction			
Test and Estimated	Acceptable Samples	Amount	Instructions
Turnaround Time	- , , ,		
Serology	Serum (red top tube	Minimum	The following specimen types
(performed at CDC)	or serum separator)	sample	may be submitted:
Estimated turnaround time: 2 weeks; less than 4 days for critical specimens	OR Whole blood (purple, green, or blue top tube)	volume is 4 mL	 Serum drawn near admission with clots retained from red top tube As late as serum is available Convalescent serum drawn approximately 21 days after first specimen Post-mortem heart blood
			Serum samples must be shipped to the CDC on dry ice in a plastic tube. Clots and acute blood for virus isolation must be sent on dry ice in a plastic tube.
Immunohistochemistry (performed at CDC)	Lung, kidney, and spleen tissues are preferred. Other	Consult with DCLS	Specimen packaging requirements: • Paraffin blocks are preferred,
Estimated turnaround time: 8 weeks upon specimen receipt	tissues that may be sent include lymph nodes, heart, pancreas, pituitary, brain, or liver.		particularly if death was not recent If paraffin blocks are not available, formalin-fixed tissues may be sent Ship paraffin blocks or formalin-fixed tissue at room temperature; do not freeze An autopsy or surgical report must accompany the specimen
Estimated turnaround time when performed at CDC: 2 weeks; less than 4 days for critical specimens Estimated turnaround time for Ebola RT-PCR testing at DCLS: 3–5 hours upon specimen receipt.	CDC: Prefer whole blood (EDTA) (purple, yellow, or blue top tube), fresh frozen tissue. Serum can also be used if only sample available. DCLS: whole blood EDTA only	Minimum sample volume is 4 mL Fresh frozen tissues should be at least 1cm ³ , except for biopsies	Ship sample frozen on dry ice in a plastic tube. Do not freeze glass tubes.

^{*}General instructions for viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) are presented in this table and these do not address yellow fever or dengue fever. Specific instructions for Ebola virus and Marburg virus are available on the <u>Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services (DCLS) website</u>. If VHF is suspected, notify the <u>local health department</u> immediately to discuss the case and laboratory testing. If VDH approves testing, specimens may be sent to the DCLS with the DCLS Test Request Form; include the name of the test on the form. For questions about specimen collection, the DCLS Emergency Officer can be reached 24/7 at 804-335-4617.

4. Treatment

Patients with VHF should receive supportive therapy for symptoms and complications, but in general, there are limited specific treatments. Supportive therapy includes maintenance of fluid and electrolyte balance, mechanical ventilation, dialysis, steroids (if adrenal involvement), and antibiotics for secondary bacterial infections.

Early treatment with ribavirin, an antiviral drug, can be effective for treating patients with Lassa fever, other Old World arenaviruses, and New World arenaviruses. Ribavirin might be effective for treating Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, but more data are needed to evaluate this. Ribavirin is not effective against filoviruses or flaviviruses. Intravenous ribavirin can be obtained for compassionate use through FDA from Valeant Pharmaceuticals (Aliso Viejo, California). The healthcare provider should initiate the request to FDA at 301-796-1500 or, during after hours, at 866-300-4374, and should also simultaneously notify Valeant Pharmaceuticals at 800-548-5100, extension 5. Requesting ribavirin through the emergency investigational new drug process is explained on FDA's website.

Inmazeb™ and Ebanga™ are FDA-approved monoclonal antibody treatments for Ebola Virus Disease caused by Zaire ebolavirus in adults and children. Inmazeb is a combination of three monoclonal antibodies and Ebanga is a single monoclonal antibody. They were approved by FDA in 2020. Neither drug has been evaluated for efficacy against other species of ebolaviruses. CDC is available 24/7 for consultation to state and local health departments by calling the CDC Emergency Operations Center at 770-488-7100 or via email at eocreport@cdc.gov.

Other experimental treatments, such as monoclonal antibody cocktails and antivirals, have been used in some patients, but there is limited evidence of their effectiveness on clinical outcome.

5. Postexposure Prophylaxis

Persons exposed to a virus that causes VHF, including close contacts of a patient with VHF, are recommended to be under postexposure surveillance for 21 days after the last known or potential exposure. Depending on the risk of exposure, self-monitoring or active monitoring by public health might be recommended. In a 2002 paper by Borio et al, the Working Group on Civilian Biodefense did not recommend prophylactic antiviral therapy for persons exposed to any hemorrhagic fever viruses (including Lassa virus) in the absence of clinical illness; instead, the group recommended monitoring the exposed person for 21 days and, if symptoms suggestive of VHF develop or fever (≥101°F) are documented, ribavirin therapy should be initiated unless another diagnosis is confirmed (or the etiologic agent is known to be a filovirus or flavivirus). Other researchers have suggested considering postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) with ribavirin for persons exposed to an arenavirus or bunyavirus, particularly if a high-risk exposure (e.g., needlestick injury) has occurred.

6. Vaccination

FDA-approved vaccines against VHF are not commercially available in the United States, with the exception of the yellow fever vaccine.

Ervebo® is the first FDA- approved vaccine for Ebola. It is safe and protective against Zaire ebolavirus. Ervebo is recommended for the prevention of disease caused by Zaire ebolavirus in individuals 12 months of age and older. It is not currently commercially marketed but is in the Strategic National Stockpile. It is available through CDC for preexposure vaccination for certain individuals. CDC also offers an expanded access Investigational New Drug (IND) program to allow booster dose administration in adults who were previously vaccinated and have potential risk for occupational exposure to Zaire ebolavirus.

A human vaccine for Kyasanur Forest Disease and an animal vaccine for Rift Valley Fever are used in endemic areas; in addition, there are investigational vaccines for Argentine hemorrhagic fever, Ebola virus disease, and Rift Valley fever.

7. Infection Control

The following infection control recommendations should be followed when caring for persons with suspected VHF:

- For **Ebola virus disease**, refer to CDC's infection control and prevention guidance. Note that, as of this writing, CDC has separate personal protective equipment (PPE) guidance depending on the status of the person suspected of having Ebola virus disease and their clinical presentation.
 - Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Hospitalized Patients with Known or Suspected Ebola Virus Disease in U.S. Hospitals
 - Donning and Doffing Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for Evaluating Persons Under Investigation (PUIs) for Ebola Who Are Clinically Stable and Do Not Have Bleeding, Vomiting, or Diarrhea
 - Guidance on Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) To Be Used by Healthcare Workers
 during Management of Patients with Confirmed Ebola or Persons under Investigation
 (PUIs) for Ebola who are Clinically Unstable or Have Bleeding, Vomiting, or Diarrhea in
 U.S. Hospitals, Including Procedures for Donning and Doffing PPE
 - o Interim Guidance for Environmental Infection Control in Hospitals for Ebola Virus
 - In the case of a child with suspected or confirmed Ebola virus disease, resources for discussing parental presence can be found here:
 - Parental Presence During Treatment of Ebola or Other Highly Consequential Infection (American Academy of Pediatrics)
 - Parental Presence at the Bedside of a Child with Suspected Ebola: An Expert <u>Discussion</u>
- For VHF caused by other viruses, including Lassa, Marburg, and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever viruses, patients should be isolated in a private room and on <u>Standard</u>, <u>Contact</u>, and <u>Droplet precautions</u> for the duration of illness (see <u>2007 Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings</u> and the corresponding Appendix A updates).
 - Although transmission by the airborne route has not been established, <u>Airborne</u>
 <u>Precautions</u> may be initiated for patients if bioterrorism is suspected or for patients undergoing airborne-generating procedures (e.g., aerosolized or nebulized medication administration, diagnostic sputum induction, bronchoscopy, airway suctioning, endotracheal intubation, positive pressure ventilation via face mask and high frequency

- oscillatory ventilation). <u>Airborne Precautions</u> entail placement of the patient in a negative pressure isolation room with 6–12 air changes per hour, air exhausted directly to the outdoors or passage through a high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter before recirculation, and door kept closed.
- Staff should be trained on the correct use of PPE and demonstrate proficiency in donning and doffing PPE before actual patient care. A trained observer of donning and doffing PPE is strongly recommended.
- PPE should include gloves and fluid-resistant or impermeable gown, face/eye protection with masks, goggles, or face shields. Additional PPE, including double gloves, leg and shoe coverings may be used. When performing aerosol-generating procedures, use a NIOSH-certified, fit-tested N-95 or higher respirator.
- A private patient room is preferred. If multiple patients with viral hemorrhagic fever are in a health care facility, they should be cared for in the same part of the hospital to minimize exposures to others.
- Nonessential staff and visitors should be restricted from entering the room of patients with suspected VHF. A log of persons entering the patient's room should be maintained. (See references in Ebola virus disease section above for parental presence with a child.)
- Before exiting the room of a patient with suspected VHF, safely remove and dispose of all protective gear, and clean and disinfect shoes that are soiled with body fluids as described in the section on environmental infection control below.
- To prevent percutaneous injuries, needles and other sharps should be used and disposed of in accordance with recommendations for Standard Precautions.
- o Healthcare workers should strictly adhere to hand hygiene.
- Healthcare workers should use barrier precautions to prevent skin or mucous membrane exposure of the eyes, nose, and mouth with patient blood, other body fluids, secretions (including respiratory droplets), or prevent contact with items or environmental surfaces that may be soiled.
- If the patient requires a surgical or obstetric procedure, consult the local health department and Infection Preventionist regarding appropriate precautions for these invasive procedures.

8. Decontamination

- Environmental surfaces or inanimate objects contaminated with blood, other body fluids, secretions, or excretions should be cleaned and disinfected using standard procedures.
 - o For cleaning and disinfection for Ebola virus, refer to CDC's Ebola guidance for clinicians.
- Disinfection can be accomplished using a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)registered hospital disinfectant or a 1:100 daily dilution of household bleach (1/4 cup bleach
 to 1 gallon water). For grossly soiled surfaces, (e.g., vomitus or stool), use a 1:10 dilution of
 household bleach.
- Soiled linens should be incinerated, autoclaved, or placed in double, clearly labeled leakproof bags at the site of use, and discarded. Hospital housekeeping staff and linen handlers should wear appropriate PPE when handling or cleaning potentially contaminated material or surfaces.
- Liquid medical waste such as feces and vomitus can be disposed of in the sanitary sewer following local sewage disposal requirements. Care should be taken to avoid splashing when disposing of these materials.
- When discarding solid medical waste (e.g., needles, syringes, and tubing) contaminated with blood or other body fluids from VHF patients, contain the waste with minimal agitation

during handling. Properly contained wastes should be managed according to existing local and state regulations for ensuring health and environmental safety during medical waste treatment and disposal. On-site treatment of the waste in an incinerator or a gravity displacement autoclave for decontamination purposes will help to minimize handling of contaminated waste. Alternatively, off-site medical waste treatment resources may be used.

9. Postmortem Practices

If VHF is suspected as a cause of death, the <u>District Office of the Chief Medical Examiner</u> should be notified immediately. Contact with cadavers has been implicated as a source of transmission in previous VHF outbreaks. Prompt burial or cremation of the deceased, with minimal handling, is recommended. No embalming should be done. Remains should be wrapped in sealed leak-proof material and cremated or buried promptly in a sealed casket. If an autopsy is necessary, it should be performed only after consultation with and approval from VDH and CDC and by specially trained persons using VHF-specific barrier precautions, HEPA-filtered respirators, and negative-pressure rooms.

10. Public Health Measures

- Suspected or confirmed VHF cases should be reported immediately to the <u>local health</u> <u>department</u>.
- Laboratory specimens should be sent to the state public health laboratory (DCLS) for
 preliminary testing of agent and/or shipment to the CDC <u>after</u> VDH consultation and
 approval. For questions about specimen collection, the DCLS Emergency Officer can be
 reached 24 hours a day/7 days a week at 804-335-4617.
- Designated public health authority should begin an epidemiologic investigation.
 - Collect detailed information from the patient to attempt to identify the source of the exposure.
 - Investigate contacts of the patient for compatible illness to investigate a potential common exposure.
 - Implement control measures to prevent disease and additional exposures. Monitor close contacts of VHF patients for 21 days. For laboratorians who handled infectious specimens or others who were potentially exposed before identification as a VHF, postexposure monitoring might be recommended based on a risk assessment.
 - VDH will work with the CDC, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other state or federal agencies as necessary.

11. References and Resources

American Society for Microbiology (ASM). Sentinel Level Clinical Laboratory Guidelines for Suspected Agents of Bioterrorism and Emerging Infectious Diseases: *Clinical Laboratory Bioterrorism Readiness Plan* (revised March 2013). https://asm.org/ASM/media/Policy-and-Advocacy/LRN/Sentinel%20Files/BT-Readiness.pdf (Accessed June 16, 2023)

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Appendix: Epidemiology and clinical manifestations of specific viruses causing viral hemorrhagic fever by virus family

Please see the appendix table below.

Note: Other hemorrhagic fever viruses exist in these categories; however, the viruses that pose the most serious risk as biological weapons are the following: arenaviruses (Lassa virus, New World arenaviruses), bunyaviruses (Rift Valley fever virus), filoviruses (Ebola virus, Marburg/Ravn virus), and flaviviruses (yellow fever virus, Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus, Kyasanur Forest disease virus). Dengue virus, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever viruses and hantaviruses are considered less likely to be used as biological weapons (Borio, et al 2002). The role of other hemorrhagic fever viruses as potential weapons is not known.

Appendix. Epidemiology and clinical manifestations of specific viruses causing viral hemorrhagic fever by virus family

VHF (Family/Order)	Organism	Natural Reservoir	Person-to- person Transmission	Occurrence	Incubation Period	Signs and Symptoms	Case- fatality Rate
Lassa Fever (Arenaviruses)	Lassa virus	Multimammate rat (Mastomys rodent)	Yes	Endemic in Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone and probably in other West African countries. An estimated 100,000–300,000 infections, including approximately 5,000 deaths, occur annually. In some areas of Sierra Leone and Liberia, it is known that 10%–16% of people admitted to hospitals every year have Lassa fever.	6–21 days	Asymptomatic/mild (80%): slight fever, general malaise, weakness, and headache Severe (20%): multisystem involvement and hemorrhaging (e.g., in gums, eyes, or nose), respiratory distress, vomiting, facial swelling, pain in the chest, back, and abdomen, and shock. Neurological symptoms (e.g., hearing loss, tremors, and encephalitis) can be present. Pregnant women are more likely to develop severe disease and fetal loss occurs in >80% of cases. Deafness occurs in ~25% of patients who survive; half of these patients regain partial hearing after 1–3 months.	~1% overall ~15–20% among hospitalized patients
New World Arenaviruses (Arenaviruses)	Multiple viruses Machupo - Bolivian hemorrhagic fever (HF) Junin - Argentine HF Guanarito - Venezuelan HF Sabia - Brazilian HF Chapare - Chapare HF in Bolivia	Rats and mice Sabia and Chapare: unknown, presumed to be rodent host	Yes	Virus and host dependent Primarily limited to certain areas in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Venezuela	Virus dependent Typically, 6–14 days Range: 5–21 days	Asymptomatic infections occur Signs and symptoms include: fever, headache, anorexia, malaise, muscle pain, with pain especially in the lower back; other symptoms might include nausea, dizziness, abdominal pain, vomiting, diarrhea, sore throat, flushing of the head and torso, or generalized lymphadenopathy Most patients improve after 1–2 weeks; ~1/3 of untreated cases become severe and life-threatening. Petechiae and ecchymosis on the skin or gums, bleeding from the vagina or gastrointestinal tract, and neurologic symptoms might be present.	15–30% in untreated patients

VHF (Family/Order)	Organism	Natural Reservoir	Person-to- person Transmission	Occurrence	Incubation Period	Signs and Symptoms	Case- fatality Rate
Rift Valley Fever (Bunyavirales)	Rift Valley fever virus	Ruminants (e.g., cattle, sheep, and possibly wild ruminants), rats in some areas	No	First reported in livestock in Kenya's Rift Valley in the early 1910s Generally found in eastern and southern Africa, but exists in most of sub-Saharan Africa, including West Africa and Madagascar In September 2000, an outbreak was reported in Saudi Arabia and subsequently, Yemen. This outbreak represented the first identified cases outside Africa.	2–6 days	Most common: asymptomatic or mild flulike illness with fever, pain in the muscle and joints, and headache. Most patients recover within one week. Severe illness (8–10%) may include the following: Ocular form - blurred and decreased vision that occurs 1–3 weeks after illness onset and might resolve within 10–12 weeks Meningoencephalitis form - headaches, memory loss, hallucinations, confusion, disorientation, vertigo, convulsions, lethargy, and coma. This form occurs in less than 1% of patients and presents 1–4 weeks after initial symptoms appear. Although death is rare, neurological deficits often persist. Hemorrhagic fever form - occurs in <1% of patients, may begin with jaundice and other signs of liver impairment, followed by vomiting blood, bloody stool, or bleeding from gums, skin, nose, and injection sites. These symptoms appear 2–4 days after initial onset and death usually occurs 3–6 days later.	<1% overall ~50% among those with hemorrhagic fever form
Ebola Virus Disease (Filoviruses)	Ebola virus (Includes	Unknown, presumed to be fruit bats	Yes	First identified in 1976, sporadic outbreaks in Africa, primarily sub-Saharan	8–10 days Range:	Fever, fatigue, headache, joint and muscle aches, and sore throat. These are followed by diarrhea, vomiting, and symptoms of	~50% overall
(species: Sudan, Zaire, Reston, Tai Forest, and Bundibugyo)			countries. Largest outbreak in 2014–2016 in West Africa. Most recent outbreak in Uganda in September 2022, caused by Sudan ebolavirus; ended January 11, 2023.	2–21 days	impaired kidney and liver function, and in some cases bleeding inside and outside the body.	25–90% in outbreaks

VHF (Family/Order)	Organism	Natural Reservoir	Person-to- person Transmission	Occurrence	Incubation Period	Signs and Symptoms	Case- fatality Rate
Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever (Filoviruses)	Marburg virus, Ravn virus	Fruit bat (Rousettus aegypticus)	Yes	First identified in 1967 when outbreaks occurred simultaneously in laboratories in Germany and Yugoslavia. Has been identified in: Uganda, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, and Angola A few cases outside of Africa have been identified and were related to laboratory exposure or importation after travel to Africa Most recent outbreaks: early 2023 in Tanzania and Equatorial Guinea; declared over in June 2023	5–10 days Range: 2–21 days	Sudden symptom onset marked by high fever, severe headache, and severe malaise. Muscle aches and pains are common. On the third day, severe diarrhea, abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting can begin. A maculopapular rash, most prominent on the trunk (chest, back, stomach), might occur 2–7 days after initial symptom onset. Symptoms become increasingly severe and can include jaundice, inflammation of the pancreas, severe weight loss, delirium, shock, liver failure, severe hemorrhaging (which occurs 5–7 days after onset), and multiorgan dysfunction. Central nervous system involvement manifests as confusion, irritability, and aggression. Orchitis, which can occur during the late stages of infection, has occasionally been reported.	23–90%
Yellow Fever (Flaviviruses)	Yellow fever virus	Nonhuman and human primates	Yes (Also, vectorborne transmission via infected mosquitoes, primarily Aedes or Haemagogus spp.)	Endemic in parts of Africa (particularly sub-Saharan West Africa); Central/South America. Sylvatic (jungle) transmission cycle – via nonhuman primates and mosquitoes in the forest canopy in tropical regions of Africa and Latin America Intermediate (savannah) transmission cycle - via various Aedes spp., humans, and nonhuman primates in humid and semi humid areas of Africa Urban transmission cycle – via humans and mosquitoes (Aedes aegypti) in parts of Africa, particularly West Africa	3–6 days	Most infections are asymptomatic Symptoms include fever, chills, headache, backache, general muscle pain, prostration, nausea, and vomiting. Some patients may experience mild, febrile illness. In approximately 15% of cases, there is a brief remission of symptoms lasting hours to a day followed by the recurrence of initial symptoms and progression to jaundice and hemorrhagic symptoms. Leukopenia (most pronounced around Day 5 of infection), leukocytosis (usually in second week of infection), elevated liver enzymes, abnormal clotting factors, albuminuria and anuria may be seen as a result of liver and renal failure.	30–60% for severe disease

VHF	Organism	Natural	Person-to-	Occurrence	Incubation	Signs and Symptoms	Case-
(Family/Order)	_	Reservoir	person Transmission		Period		fatality Rate
Kyasanur Forest Disease (Flaviviruses)	Kyasanur Forest disease virus	Rodents, bats, and other small mammals Monkeys appear to be amplifying hosts Arthropod vector: ticks (Haemaphysalis spinigera)	No	Identified in 1957 from a sick monkey from the Kyasanur Forest in India Since then, approximately 400–500 human cases per year have been reported	3–8 days	Sudden onset symptoms with fever, chills, and headache, followed in 3–4 days by severe muscle pain, vomiting, gastrointestinal symptoms, and bleeding. Abnormally low blood pressure and low platelet, red blood cell, and white blood cell counts might occur. Some patients recover without complication after 1–2 weeks. However, some patients (10–20%) experience a second wave of symptoms at the start of the third week that include fever and neurological manifestations, such as severe headache, mental disturbances, tremors, and vision deficits.	3–5%
Omsk hemorrhagic fever (Flaviviruses)	Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus	Rodents (including muskrats and voles) Arthropod vector: ticks (Dermacentor reticulatus, Dermacentor marginatus, lxodes persulcatus)	No	First described between 1945 and 1947 in Omsk, Russia from patients with hemorrhagic fever, and is endemic in the western Siberia region	3–8 days	Sudden onset symptoms with fever, chills, and headache, followed in 3–4 days with severe muscle pain, vomiting, gastrointestinal symptoms, and bleeding. Some patients might experience abnormally low blood pressure and low platelet, red blood cell, and white blood cell counts. After 1–2 weeks of symptoms, some patients recover without complication. Other patients might experience a second wave of symptoms at the beginning of the third week that include fever and encephalitis.	<1-3%