



Richmond Regional Water Crisis

Hanover County After-Action Report

February 12, 2025

Agenda

- Introduction and Purpose
- Timeline of Events
- Technical Evaluation and Recommendations
- Communication Evaluation and Recommendations
- Questions



Introduction and Purpose

- Richmond Water Treatment Plant Outage started on 1/6/2025
- Hanover County lost public water service in Mechanicsville for 24-36 hours (4-day Boil Water Advisory)
- Hanover County After Action Report
 - Dewberry hired to evaluate technical components of Hanover County response
 - WaterPIO hired to evaluate communications (COMMS) components of Hanover County response


Timeline - Monday 1.6.25 & **Tuesday 1.7.25** (Richmond known facts)

County Operations, Emergency Operations, County Administration

Department of Public Utilities (DPU)

Regional Events and Actions

Communications






Timeline - Monday 1.6.25

- County Operations, Emergency Operations, County Administration


 Department of Public Utilities (DPU)
- Regional Events and Actions
- Communications





Timeline – Tuesday 1.7.25

County Operations, Emergency Operations, County Administration
 Department of Public Utilities (DPU)
 Regional Events and Actions
 Communications






Timeline - Wednesday 1.8.25

County Operations, Emergency Operations, County Administration

Department of Public Utilities (DPU)

Regional Events and Actions


Communications





Timeline - Thursday 1.9.25

- County Operations, Emergency Operations, County Administration
- Department of Public Utilities (DPU)
- Regional Events and Actions
- Communications






Timeline - Friday 1.10.25

County Operations, Emergency Operations, County Administration

Department of Public Utilities (DPU)

Regional Events and Actions

Communications






Timeline - Saturday 1.11.25

County Operations, Emergency Operations, County Administration

Department of Public Utilities (DPU)

Regional Events and Actions

Communications





Technical Evaluation Introduction


- Water System Overview
- Water System Operations Prior to Water Outage
- Water System Operations During Water Outage
 - Phase I: Loss of Richmond Water Supply
 - Phase II: System Isolation (East vs. West of I-95)
 - Phase III: Water Supply Restoration
- Technical Review of Hanover DPU Response
- Technical Recommendations
 - Short-Term
 - Long-Term



Water System Overview

- · Hanover Suburban Water System (HSWS)
 - 25,000 residential, commercial, and public customers
 - · Serves parts of Mechanicsville, Ashland, Doswell, and Elmont within Suburban Service Area (SSA)
- HSWS Water Supply Sources Total Supply Capacity of 24.775 million gallons per day (MGD)
 - City of Richmond (via Lockwood Booster Station) 20.0 MGD
 - North Anna River (via Doswell Water Treatment Plant) 4.0 MGD
 - Henrico County (via Route 33 connection) 0.775 MGD
- HSWS 2024 Water Demand
 - Average Daily Demand 8.6 MGD , Maximum Daily Demand 14.3 MGD
- Four (4) Pressure Zones
 - Lockwood (Mechanicsville) Typically supplied by City of Richmond water
 - Doswell Typically supplied by Doswell WTP
 - Ashland Blended (Richmond and Doswell WTP)
 - Elmont Blended (Richmond and Doswell WTP)





Water System Overview, Cont.

Water Storage and Pumping Capacity

Pressure Zone Doswell	Storage Capacity (MG)	Pumping Capacity (MGD)
Doswell	8	500000
	-	4.0
Doswell	1.0	2.0
Doswell or Ashland	0.3	1.3
Elmont	1.0	4.3
Ashland	1.0	2.0
Lockwood or Ashland	1.0	4.5
Lockwood or Ashland	1.0	4.5
Lockwood	0.5	0.7
Lockwood	1.0	-
Lockwood	-	15.3
N/A	8.9	-
HSWS	15.7	-
	Doswell or Ashland Elmont Ashland Lockwood or Ashland Lockwood or Ashland Lockwood Lockwood Lockwood N/A	Doswell or Ashland 0.3 Elmont 1.0 Ashland 1.0 Lockwood or Ashland 1.0 Lockwood or Ashland 1.0 Lockwood 0.5 Lockwood 1.0 Lockwood 1.0 Lockwood - N/A 8.9

Hanover County has an allocation of 8.9 MG of storage capacity in the Richmond system.

• Storage Recommendation (2024 Max Day) – 5 to 7.5 MG

Water System Operation Prior to Outage

- Water Supply and Demands Prior to Outage (Lower Winter Demands)
 - Average Demand 6.6 MGD
 - Richmond supplied 2/3rd of demand
 - Doswell WTP supplied 1/3rd of demand
- Water Storage Prior to Outage (Winter Operation)
 - Tanks operated at approximately 50% to maintain water quality
 - 11.7/2.8 MG storage (w/&w/o Richmond)
 - 3.85 MG max. storage recommended
 - "...Excessive storage capacity shall be avoided to prevent water quality deterioration."

12VAC5-590-1081, 1., B. of VDH Waterworks Regulations



Water System Operation During Outage

- Phase I: Loss of Richmond Supply
 - Initial Richmond Water Treatment Plant Outage 2 PM of 1/6/2025 (Monday)
 - DPU followed "Loss of Richmond Water Protocol"
 - Increased Doswell WTP to full capacity
 - Initially reduced pumping rate...
 - then turned off Lockwood BPS (after draft Richmond BWA)
 - Turned around East WST to supply Mechanicsville with Doswell WTP water
 - Tested Route 1 Henrico Connection (inadequate pressure)
 - Additional DPU actions
 - Lowered discharge pressure for all pump stations to reduce demand
 - Slowly used available storage to supplement supply deficit

Water System Operation During Outage, Cont.

- Phase II: System Isolation (East vs. West of I-95)
 - Excess storage capacity ran out around 2 PM of 1/7/2025 (Tuesday)
 - Turned off East Water Storage Tank and Pump Station
 - Isolated Mechanicsville Pressure Zone (East of I-95) from Ashland Pressure Zone (West of I-95)
 - Issue Boil Water Advisory for Mechanicsville (East of I-95)
 - Maintained potable water service to Doswell, Ashland, and Elmont

Water System Operation During Outage, Cont.

- Phase III: Water Supply Restoration
 - DPU started seeing gravity flow from Richmond around 4 PM on 1/8/2025 (Wednesday)
 - Slowly increased pumping rate at Lockwood BPS till 8:30 PM
 - Increased pressures by morning of 1/9/2025
 - DPU operations staff started flushing water transmission mains in morning of 1/9/2025 (Thursday)
 - DPU took 2 bacteriological tests 16 hours apart
 - Once both tests passed, VDH was notified, and Boil Water Advisory was lifted around noon on 1/11/2025 (Saturday)
 - Mechanicsville pressure zone was back in operation

Technical Review of DPU Response

- Hanover County DPU staff performed very well
 - Hanover County DPU followed Richmond Waterline Emergency Response Procedure that was in place
 - Based on operational expertise and system knowledge, DPU performed additional measures to extend water service for Mechanicsville
- DPU maintained water service to 2/3rds of the system (Ashland, Elmont, Doswell) for duration of outage
- DPU staff proactively flushed transmission mains and communicated with VDH for efficient water service restoration in Mechanicsville

Technical Evaluation Recommendations

- Water demand during Richmond WTP outage exceeded supply
- Short-Term Recommendations
 - Study for Henrico County water connections at Routes 1 and 33
 - Potential for near term improvement to provide additional supplemental water supply in the event of a future outage
- Long-Term Recommendations
 - Complete study to evaluate additional long term water supply sources
 - Complete study to evaluate water transmission improvements within existing water system



COMMS Evaluation: Introduction

- WaterPIO Founded in 2017. Based in Hampstead, NC.
- Helps utilities, engineering firms, industry orgs, & state agencies improve customer, media, & crisis communications. 20+ states.
- In water since 2007. Former network & DC local news producer.
- Certified crisis communicators. 20+ years.
- Conducted after-actions reviews for Austin Water post-Texas Freeze and Asheville post-Xmas 2022 systemwide outage.
- First hired by Hanover County Public Utilities for Lead & Copper Rule work in Fall 2024.

COMMS Evaluation: Process

- Followed approach used for previous after-action reviews.
- Interviews conducted with leadership, staff, & local news media.
- Due to the compress timeframe, also used questionnaires.
- All people interviewed received same questions. Unique questions asked during follow-up. Media, off-the-record.
- Processes in place for protection of participants. No direct quotes used. Paraphrased. Comments that mirrored others were joined together using general terms.
- Process worked. Candor provided at all levels, including press.

COMMS Evaluation: Incident Challenges

- Hanover County's operational & communications responses hampered by poor Richmond COMMS at the start of the event.
- Initial Richmond information downplayed the event, leading to COMMS that harmed HC credibility. (Voluntary restrictions became outage & boil water advisory in roughly a day.)
- HC Operations involvement helped get COMMS up to speed.
 Fortunate. Richmond COMMS process didn't help HC COMMS.
- HC COMMS had to operate independently of Richmond. Some efforts for joint COMMS were made, but trust did not exist.

COMMS Evaluation: Richmond COMMS

- Report did not do a comprehensive dive about Richmond's COMMS. However, conversations, interviews, & questionnaires revealed common themes & issues.
- Richmond failed to properly inform HC COMMS throughout the event. Richmond COMMS staff not up on water or crisis COMMS.
- HC's strong internal COMMS helped fill the gaps. Operations kept HC COMMS & Customer Service staff fully involved.
- Minor to moderate gaps can be addressed through Richmond improvement & HC creation of water-specific crisis COMMS plan.

COMMS Evaluation: Hanover County Performance

- Solid team of COMMS professionals in place.
- COMMS role clearly respected. Reflected by internal COMMS.
- Conducted multi-level COMMS with accuracy & speed.
- Did not use HC crisis COMMS plan. Viewed for fire/EMS/police.
- Despite lack of plan, work mirrored proper crisis COMMS.
- "Mistakes," such as hiccups with early use of Facebook Live & delay in creating a Joint Information Center (JIC) easily addressed.
- Biggest gap: Work with the news media. "One-way, not two-way."

COMMS Evaluation: Crisis COMMS Plan

- While performance was at a high level, lack of water-related crisis COMMS plan. Creation is this report's top recommendation.
- Water crisis COMMS plan: Gets HC up to speed fast. Helps with speed & accuracy. Guards against mis/disinformation.
- Plan provides structure, quality control, approval process, & templated information for speed & confidence.
- Prevents gaps in info rollout to news media, electeds, critical customers, community orgs, & customers.
- HC work mirrored proper crisis COMMS. Creation shouldn't take long, especially with lessons learned from incident.

COMMS Evaluation: Internal COMMS

- Overall internal COMMS between leadership, COMMS staff, & other employees was impressive.
- "Operational approach" that is detriment to Water World not used.
- Made up for issues with Richmond COMMS & response
- Strong across all levels, thanks to org chart & teamwork.
- Reflected in strong external COMMS.
- Customer Service staff felt fully informed. Often a gap with other utilities. Enabled "front line" success.

COMMS Evaluation: External COMMS

- Overall external COMMS between leadership, COMMS staff, & other employees was excellent with some outreach gaps.
- HC COMMS delivered clear & accurate information at all times.
- Social use was excellent. FB Live helped w/minor issues.
- Website had/has excellent information in easy-to-use format.
- Customer Service extended hours. Escalation process worked.
- While news media takes issue with access, press releases were cited as comprehensive & clear re: information provided.
- Need for increased outreach to community, NGOs, & faith orgs.

COMMS Evaluation: News Media

- While the information provided was cited for being full and accurate, news outlets took issue with HC engagement.
- "One-way" work instead "two-way." Pushed info out with limited engagement. (COMMS staff complimented for interview help.)
- Facebook Lives became de-facto press conferences. Helpful for many, but press felt uninvited, kept at arm's length.
- All wanted invites, ability to ask questions during Live sessions.
- HC "help" explanation logical. Lack of prior interaction. Distance.
- Press differed on two-a-day sked. Some fine, others wanted more.

COMMS Evaluation: Secondary Findings

- Don't use Voluntary Restrictions. Water use INCREASES.
- Water Distribution COMMS: Difficult to balance notice with public reaction. Properly sent out, but truck had issues. For future, make sure truck is closer to arrival before sending notification.
- Spokesperson recommendation. Understandable use of leadership without deviation. Best practice: IC is not spokesperson. Unified PIO is used. For consideration.
- Greater use of Hanover Alert/CodeRed. Use for ALL water crises.
 Helps with renters/non-customers. Training for COMMS.
- Include community orgs & school systems in crisis COMMS plan.

Questions



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